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FIRST DAY 
VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS 
Roanoke, Virginia - July 28, 1987 . 
SECTION ONE 
1. On the night of April 3, 1986, Ronnie Roadrunner was severely 
injured when he drove his automobile into the side of a moving freight train 
at a railroad crossing in Chesterfield County, Virginia. On July 8, 1986, 
Roadrunner filed an action against the Choo-Choo Railroad Company, the owner 
and operator of the train, in the Circuit Court of Chesterfield County for 
damages in which he alleged, among other things, that he did not see the sign 
placed at the crossing by the railroad company to warn a motorist of the 
crossing because the reflectors on that sign had fallen off. After the 
parties were at issue, Roadrunner's lawyer, Marvin Bally, served the following 
interrogatories on the Choo-Choo Railroad Company: 
No. 1. State whether any changes have been made by defendant 
subsequent to the accident in the design of the signs it installed at 
the crossing with particular reference to the manner of attaching 
reflectors to the signs. 
No. 2. If the answer to No. 1 is in the affirmative, set forth the 
details concerning any such changes. · 
No. 3. State the name and address of each member of the crew of 
defendant's train that was involved in the accident. 
The Choo-Choo Railroad Company had, in fact, made changes in the design 
of its signs and in the manner of attaching the reflectors to those signs. 
Larry Loco, Choo-Choo's lawyer, advised the railroad that in his opinion it is 
not required to answer interrogatory number 1 and interrogatory number 2, but 
that it must answer to interrogatory number 3. 
(a) In view of Loco's advice to Choo-Choo, does Choo-Choo need to 
serve a response of any kind to interrogatories numbers 1 and 2? If so, (1) 
what should be served, (2) when should it be served and (3) by whom should it 
be signed? 
(b) When should the answer to interrogatory number 3 be served and by 
whom should it be signed? 
(c) Assuming that Roadrunner, through his attorney, properly proceeds 
to obtain a ruling from the Court concerning.his right to the information 
sought by interrogatories numbers 1 and 2, should the Court require Choo-Choo 
to answer them? 
* * * * * 
SECTION ONE PAGE TWO 
2. Frankie Falon was tried by a jury in the Circuit Court of the City 
of Danville, Virginia on May 7, 1986, for the crime of the armed robbery of 
Valerie Victim on March 3, 1986. Falon was represented by Solomen Shrewd who, 
in his opening statement, told the jury that the evidence would show that Ms. 
Victim had been indicted in 1985 for perjury and that the jury should keep 
that in mind while listening to her testimony. 
During the trial Falon did not take the stand to testify on his own 
behalf. The trial court offered to give the following instruction: 
Failure of the defendant to testify creates no presumption 
against him and in considering his innocence or guilt, his 
failure to testify is not a circumstance which the jury is 
entitled to consider 
Shrewd rejected the trial court's offer to give that instruction 
because he thought it would serve only to magnify the defendant's failure to 
testify and to raise adverse inferences in the minds of the jurors. Thus, the 
trial court did not give that instruction. 
The jury convicted Falon of the crime with which he was charged and 
fixed his punishment at 10 years in the penitentiary. The trial court entered 
a final order sentencing Falon on that verdict 
The Supreme Court of Virginia granted Falon a writ of error limited to 
the following claim by Falon: 
The trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that 
the failure of the defendant to testify creates no 
presumption ~gainst the defendant and should not be 
considered by the jury in considering his guilt or innocence. 
Falon argued that the trial court had the absolute duty to give such an 
instruction to the jury, that he (the defendant) had the absolute right to 
have such an instruction given to the jury, and that such right could not be 
waived by his attorney, Solomen Shrewd. Falon's argument was based upon the 
provision of Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-268 which provides: 
In any case of felony or misdeamanor, the accused may be 
sworn and examined in his own behalf, and if so sworn and 
examined, he shall be deemed to have waived his privilege of 
not giving evidence against himself, and shall be subject to 
cross-examination as any other witness; but his failure to 
testify shall create no presumption against him, nor be the 
subject of any comment before the court or jury by the 
prosecuting attorney. 
(a) Did the trial court err in failing to give the instruction? 
(b) Was it ethically proper for Shrewd to tell the jury in his opening 
statement that Ms. Victim had been indicted for perjury? 
* * * * * 
SECTION ONE PAGE THREE 
3. John Doe instituted an action against Trucking Company in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in which he 
sought damages in the amount of $750,000 for injuries sustained when he was 
struck by a truck owned by Trucking Company and operated by David Driver. Doe 
alleged that his injuries were caused by the negligence of Driver who, at the 
time and place of the accident, was an employee of Trucking Company acting 
within the scope of his employment. Trucking Company filed an answer denying 
the allegations of the complaint. 
Assume that the District Court had jurisdiction of the action on the 
basis of diversity of citizenship. Assume further ~hat before trial Trucking 
Company, in an answer to a request for admission served by Doe, admitted that 
Driver was an employee of Trucking Company. The case was tried before the 
Court without a jury. 
During the presentation of Doe's case, he introduced evidence 
establishing a prima facie case of negligence on the part of Driver which was 
a proximate cause of the accident and damages sustained by him• However, he 
failed to introduce evidence to establish that Driver was acting within the 
scope of his employment at the time of the accident. Doe then rested. 
Larry Lawyer, attorney for Trucking Company, knew that Driver was 
acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident and that 
this fact would be established if he called Driver as a witness. He also knew 
that Driver would give testimony that would tend to indicate that Driver was 
not negligent or, at the least, that Doe was guilty of contributory 
negligence. After Doe rested his case, Lawyer moved the Court under Rule 
4l(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the action on the 
ground that upon the facts and the law Doe had failed to show a right to 
relief because he failed to establish that Driver was acting within the scope 
of his employment by Trucking Company at the time of the accident. The Court 
declined to render any judgment until the close of all evidence. 
(a) Did the trial court err by declining to render any judgment on 
Trucking Company's motion to dismiss at the conclusion of Doe's case? 
(b) If, upon the trial court's refusal to render any judgment upon 
Trucking company's motion, Trucking Company refused to put on any evidence and 
rested its case, could Trucking Company appeal a judgment entered for Doe by 
the trial court on the ground that Doe's evidence was insufficient to support 
the judgment? 
(c) If, upon the trial court's refusal to render any judgment upon 
Trucking company's motion, Trucking Company put on evidence during the 
presentation of which the fact was established that Driver was acting within 
the scope of his employment, could Trucking Company successfully assert on 
appeal that the trial court erred by refusing to grant its motion to dismiss 
at the conclusion of Doe's case? 
* * * * * 
SECTION ONE PAGE FOUR 
4. Charles Contractor and Orville Owner entered into a contract 
pursuant to which Contractor agreed to complete construction of an office 
building for Owner on or before September 30, 1986. Contractor agreed to pay 
damages to Owner in the amount of $1,000 a day for each day completion was 
delayed beyond September 30, 1986, except that Contractor would "not be 
responsible for delays in the completion of the building caused by Owner." 
The Building was not completed until November 1, 1986 and Owner held back 
$31,000 from his final payment to Contractor. 
Contractor filed an action in the appropriate Circuit Court in Virginia 
in which he sought judgment against Owner for $31,000, claiming that Owner had 
caused the 31 day delay by not furnishing until September 1 certain materials 
that he was obligated under the terms of the contract to furnish by August 1. 
During the trial, Contractor introduced evidence that Owner had failed to 
order the materials soon enough for them to be delivered in time for 
Contractor to complete construction by September 30, 1986, and that had the 
materials been delivered by August 1, the building would have been completed 
on time. Owner's evidence was that he had ordered the materials in plenty of 
time for them to be delivered by August 1, but that the manufacturer of the 
materials had been delayed in the manufacture of such materials because of a 
breakdown in his machinery. 
The trial court instructed the jury that "unless you believe from a 
preponderance of the evidence that Owner negligently failed to deliver 
material to Contractor in time for him to complete construction prior to 
September 30, 1986, you shall return your verdict for Owner." Contractor's 
attorney objected to the instruction on the ground "that it was contrary to 
the law and the evidence." The jury returned a verdict for Owner upon which 
the trial court entered judgment. Contractor's petition for appeal was 
granted by the Supreme Court of Virginia. Among the assignments of error 
contained in Contractor's petition was that the trial court erred in granting 
the instruction referred to above. 
(a) On appeal, Contractor's attorney argued that the trial court erred 
in giving the instruction because it improperly conditioned Owner's 
responsibility for the delay upon a finding of negligence whereas, under the 
provisions of the contract, Owner was responsible for delays caused by him 
even if he had not been negligent. Will the Supreme Court of Virginia 
consider this argument? 
(b) Assume that the Supreme Court of Virginia had not previously 
decided a case involving the contract language in question. As the attorney 
for Contractor, do you have an obligation to advise that Court of a recent 
decision of the Supreme Court of West Virginia, which you found during the 
research for your brief and which Owner did not cite in his brief, in which it 
was held that a contract with language identical to the one in question did 
not relieve a contractor of his obligation to complete a building by the 
specified completion date in the absence of negligence on the part of the 
owner? 
* * * * * 
SECTION ONE PAGE FIVE 
5. Mason & Burger, a prominent Roanoke law firm widely known for its 
criminal defense work, represents Mary Smith. Ms. Smith was the inhouse 
accountant for Scrooge & Marley, a partnership involved in a number of highly 
sophisticated real estate investments. Scrooge & Marley recently discharged 
Ms. Smith and brought a suit against her in equity alleging that she embezzled 
$750,000 in partnership funds and invested those funds in real estate now held 
by her and her parents, Mr. and Mrs. Smith. The bill of complaint prayed that 
the Smiths be required to make an accounting of money embezzled; that they be 
restrained from disposing of any assets during the litigation; that this real 
property be declared held in trust for the partnership; and that the Smiths be 
required to convey the property to the partnership. 
No responsive pleadings have yet been filed but Ms. Smith strenuously 
denies that she embezzled any funds from Scrooge & Marley. She has also made 
it clear that, because of accounting issues involved, the evidence supporting 
this denial will be complex, will require a number of witnesses, and will be 
sharply disputed. Credibility of witnesses will be a decisive element of the 
trial. If at all possible Mr. Mason wishes to try the case to a jury; the 
plaintiffs are equally determined to avoid a jury. 
Mr. Mason asks you for a reasoned answer, based on the foregoing 
information, to both of the following questions: 
(a) Upon what basis and by what pleadings, if any, is Ms. Smith 
entitled to a jury as a matter of right in a court of equity? 
(b) Upon what basis and upon what pleadings, if any, may a court of 
equity in its discretion allow a jury in these proceedings? 
* * * * * 
6. Jack and Jill Johnson moved to Roanoke in the spring of 1987 and 
found a house that suited them. They seek your advice regarding their 
purchase of the property. 
The property is owned by Herbert and Helen Smith who had their attorney 
prepare a land sales contract providing that the Johnsons would pay the Smiths 
a lump sum of $20,000 upon taking possession of the property and thereafter 
make all payments subsequently due under a purchase money note made by the 
Smiths at the time they purchased the property in 1978 which is secured by a 
deed of trust on the property. It further provided that the Johnsons would 
hold the Smiths harmless from any liability under the note and deed of trust 
and the Smiths would execute and deliver a general warranty deed conveying 
title to the property to the Johnsons when the remaining balance of $65,000 
under the note had been paid in full and the deed of trust released. 
Herbert Smith told the Johnsons that the land sales contract 
essentially allowed them to obtain a loan for $65,000 at an interest rate well 
below the rate currently being charged by lenders as well as save on closing 
costs because the contract need not be recorded. 
SECTION ONE PAGE SIX 
Mr. Smith gave the Johnsons copies of the note, deed of trust, and the 
deed by which the Smiths had acquired title to the property. The Johnsons 
both signed the contract and gave Mr. Smith a check for $1,000 as "earnest 
money" on the contract. 
In reviewing the contract documents, you find that the deed conveys the 
property to Herbert Smith and Helen Smith, husband and wife, as tenants by the 
entirety with right of survivorship. You find that the deed of trust contains 
a covenant whereby the Lender "may declare the note due and payable upon any 
transfer of all or any part of the property or interest therein without 
Lender's prior written consent," as we 11 as the fo 11 owing notice in the margin 
in capital letters: "THE DEBT SECURED HEREBY IS SUBJECT TO CALL IN FULL OR 
THE TERMS THEREOF BEING MODIFIED IN THE EVENT OF SALE OR CONVEYANCE OF THE 
PROPERTY CONVEYED." 
How would you advise the Johnsons on the following: 
(a) What risks, if any, are they exposed to because of the covenant 
contained in the deed of trust? 
(b) What risks, if any, would they be exposed to if the land sales 
contract is not recorded? 
* * * * * 
7. In June 1986 Roncevertes stole a watch and $500 in cash from his 
friend Cyrano's apartment. Both Roncevertes and Cyrano lived in the same 
apartment building on Main Street in Salem, Virginia. 
He used $250 of the stolen funds to pay his landlord rent for the month 
of July. Roncevertes used the other $250 to purchase a used car from 
Renault. Roncevertes sold the watch to Ramona. 
Several weeks later, Roncevertes, after undergoing a crise de 
conscience, confessed his theft to Cyrano. 
Cyrano now consults you as to the possibilities of recovering 
(a) the $250 paid to the landlord 
(b) the $250 paid to Renault 
(c) the car 
(d) the watch. 
How should you respond? 
* * * * * 
SECTION ONE PAGE SEVEN 
8. Bernice Biker, a resident of Elkton, Virginia, persuaded Ichabob 
Gold to sign her note for $3,000 made payable to Motorcycle Mania and dated 
June 1, 1983. Armed with this added signature and little else, Bernice 
purchased a new motorcycle and rode off into the sunset. Motorcycle Mania 
sold Biker's note to the Nickel and Dime Savings Bank which was unable to find 
Biker to collect. Thereupon, the bank called upon Ichabob who paid the note 
plus interest in the total amount of $3,280. On February 14, 1984, the Bank 
marked Biker's note "Paid" and delivered it to Ichabob without any formal 
assignment or other writing. 
In April of 1987, Biker returned to Elkton seeking employment in a new 
industry which was being located there. Ichabob learned of Biker's presence 
in Elkton and promptly sued her for the sum of $3,280 plus interest from the 
date Ichabob paid the Bank. 
Biker interposed a plea of the statute of limitations, asserting that 
the note was extinguished when the Bank marked it "Paid" and that the only 
right of action Ichabob had was based on an implied jJr oral agreement of 
indemnity. The trial court sustained Biker's plea, ruling that the three year 
statute governing unwritten contracts applied and that Ichabob could not 
recover. 
If Ichabob appealed this decision of the trial court, how should the 
Supreme Court rule? 
* * * * * 
9. The divorce depositions submitted to the Virginia circuit court 
judge revealed the following evidence: 
Kay and David, after a long engagement, were married on June 4, 1975. 
They cohabited together and had what David thought was a satisfactory sexual 
relationship until their separation on May 11, 1987. David suspected that 
their good friend and attorney, Arnold, was having an affair with his wife. 
On May 10, 1987, after receiving information Kay and Arnold had been seen 
together at a bar, David followed Arnold by car but lost him in traffic. 
Later that evening David saw Arnold's car parked next to his wife's car 
outside Room 159 at the local Ramada Inn. David returned to the motel early 
the next morning with witnesses and spoke to Kay outside the room, but did not 
see Arnold at the motel although his car had not been moved since the previous 
evening. Kay refused to allow David to search her motel room. 
A witness, Janet, testified that she had seen Kay and Arnold go into 
Arnold's beachfront apartment at the lunch hour almost every day from the 
first of April until the end of May, 1987. Janet, who had secretly admired 
Arnold for several years, always paid particular attention to anyone entering 
or leaving Arnold's apartment. 
Kay positively denied that she had sexual relations with Arnold. She 
protested that Arnold only gave her legal advice and prepared gourmet meals 
for her. 
SECTION ONE PAGE EIGHT 
Arnold was called as a witness and refused to testify, asserting the 
attorney-client privilege. 
(a) Assuming the above facts were proven, should the Judge grant a 
divorce to David on the grounds of adultery? 
(b) What would the decision be if Arnold had testified that he told 
David on April 5, 1987, that he, Arnold, had sexual intercourse with Kay on 
April 1st? , 
* * * * * 
10. The Town Council of South Boston, Virginia, in an effort to 
revitalize its downtown business district, voted, over spirited opposition 
from the Taxpayers League, to beautify the area by installing antique natural 
gas lamp posts, trees and flower boxes along Main Street, and paving the 
sidewalks with colonial bricks. 
The work was done by the Town's regular maintenance workers, with the 
help of a retired brick mason. The cost of labor, sand, cement and gravel was 
$3,000. 
The paving brick for the sidewalks was purchased from Southside 
Building Products Company (Southside), and was manufactured at their kiln in 
Clarksville. The bricks were delivered at a total cost of $2,000. 
Shortly after the dedication of the new project, the bricks in the 
sidewalks started to crack, and many completely disintegrated. Suzy Slagle 
tripped and fell on the defective bricks and sprained her ankle. The Town 
settled with her for $500 in compensation for her injury. The Town then 
retained a consultant at a cost of $1,000, who advised that the bricks had to 
be taken up and the sidewalks rebuilt. This work was done at a cost of $9,000. 
After an .acrimonious meeting of Council, the Town Manager was ordered 
to investigate and take appropriate legal action. Subsequently suit was filed 
on behalf of the Town against Southside for damages. Testimony at the trial 
revealed that the clay used in the bricks was of inferior quality which caused 
them to crack and disintegrate. 
Southside defended on the basis that the contract of sale with South 
Boston was silent as to quality, and that no guarantees were made. 
(a) Under these facts, is South Boston entitled to recover? 
(b) If so, how much? 
* * * * * 
